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ABSTRACT
The self-limiting revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe
offer an alternative paradigm of revolutionary change
that is reminiscent more of the American struggle for
independence in 1776 than the Jacobin tendencies that
grew out of the French Revolution of 1789. In order to
understand the contradictory impulses of the revolu-
tions of 1989—the desire for a radical renewal and the
concern for preservation—this article takes as its point
of departure the political thought of Hannah Arendt and
Edmund Burke.
KEYWORDS: Arendt, Burke, collapse of communism,
Conservatism, Jacobinism, self-limiting revolution, 1989 
This article seeks to unravel the paradoxes of
the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe2 by
taking seriously the ideas and ideals that
guided the dissident intellectuals in their
struggle for liberty and the rule of law. They
were driven by the desire not to repeat the
mistakes of the revolutionary regime that they
fought against—communism—and imposed
limits on both their methods and goals. The
result was a self-limiting revolution that re-
sembled more the American struggle for inde-
pendence in 1776 than the French Revolution
of 1789. Hence, 1989 offers a radically different
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paradigm of revolutionary change that is reminiscent of certain aspects of
thinking of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke. Both authors dealt, from
their vastly different vantage points, with the challenges of modernity. Arendt’s
work that highlighted the virtues of the American Revolution in contrast to
the shortcomings of its French counterpart is particularly relevant to a bet-
ter understanding of 1989.3 Similarly, Burke’s thoughts on the French Revolution
are remarkably prescient to the problems that the leaders of the revolutions
in Central Europe had to face two centuries later: what is an adequate response
to the challenge of radical revolutionary ideologies (from Jacobinism in the
eighteenth century to Marxism-Leninism in the twentieth century)?
A reappraisal of 1989 should help us in addressing one of the fundamental
questions of modern political life: How to build lasting political structures
on the basis of a revolution? One possible answer is simply to avoid having
a revolution. Or, if you absolutely must have a revolution (because, for exam-
ple, there is no other way of ending a tyrannical regime) it is best to pretend
that what is happening is not really a revolution. As a revolutionary leader,
do so as if you were neither a revolutionary, nor a leader (as Václav Havel did
in December 1989). The end-result may be strange and self-contradictory—a
‘conservative revolution’—but it is one that creates possibilities for the estab-
lishment of lasting political institutions that preserve liberty under the rule
of law. This is one of the reasons why Edmund Burke would have been likely
to endorse the self-limiting revolutions of 1989, even though he vehemently
opposed their famous predecessor, the French Revolution of 1789. In 1989, in
contrast to 1789, a new beginning was presented as a ‘return to normality’,
and a radical social and political change was implemented by strikingly mod-
erate methods.
Hence, I will argue that the events of 1989 are best understood as self-limit-
ing conservative revolutions in the Burkean sense. This concept is clearly
based on an oxymoron: one cannot be both a conservative and a revolution-
ary. One cannot aim at a radical political change while, at the same time, be
willing to accept the constraints of traditions and (to some extent at least)
the existing political realities of the day. Yet, the aim of this article is not to
resolve these inconsistencies, but rather to identify the conflicting impera-
tives, which endowed the events of 1989 in Central Europe with their unique
362 • Stefan Auer
CH_f13-361-390  11/22/04  11:09 PM  Page 362
character. Similarly, no sensible political actor can hope to eliminate all con-
tradictions from political life. In fact, the relative success of reluctant revo-
lutionaries may have been partly due to their realisations of their own limits.4
This realisation was reflected in the employed strategies: the concept of self-
limiting revolutions; the ideal of ‘anti-politics’ and of an ethical civil society;
and the idea of combining the pursuit of ambitious future oriented goals with
a reverence to (some aspects of) the past.
A precautionary note is in order here: clearly, a number of substantive con-
servative ideals cherished by Burke towards the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury have lost their relevance today. It is the spirit of Burke’s thinking (or the
Great Melody in Conor Cruise O’Brien terminology)5 rather than just his par-
ticular statements and positions that I believe are useful for an analysis of
the 1989 revolutions. As Martin Krygier has suggested, one should differen-
tiate between “methodological conservatism [that] is compatible with a vari-
ety of substantive political commitments” and “normative conservatism” that
is based on “a positive evaluation and attachment to what exists.”6 This dis-
tinction makes it possible to characterise the leading dissidents in Central
Europe as reluctant, or even ‘conservative revolutionaries’. Even though 
people like Václav Havel, György Konrád and Adam Michnik7 differed a
great deal amongst themselves, and in relation to Burke, with respect to their
substantive political commitments, they shared “a distinctive view of the
methods appropriate to politics.”8 In line with this, I would see the militant
counter-revolutionary pose that Burke adopted towards the end of his life as
a betrayal of one of his guiding principles: the idea that dogmatic ideologi-
cal thinking had to be rejected in any form. At any rate, the term conserva-
tive employed in this article is not to be confused with a dogmatic position
based on a set of doctrines that amount to conservative ideology. The rejec-
tion of Jacobinism must go hand in hand with the rejection of ideologies.
Hence, the dilemma that Burke and his followers had to confront was how
to fight against Jacobinism without resorting to the very same Jacobin ten-
dencies they opposed.9
Thus, it would be a very simplistic, though not an entirely implausible read-
ing of Burke, to construe the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe as ‘counter-
revolutions’. Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France was seen as “the
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manifesto of a counter-revolution” as early as 1791.10 It can be argued that
Burke’s criticism of the destructive tendencies in the French Revolution was
even more applicable to Marxism and the series of communist revolutions,
which started with the October Revolution in 1917.11 Hence, the defeat of
communism in 1989 could be simply seen as amounting to the unmaking of
1917. In line with this, the controversial German historian, Ernst Nolte, inter-
preted the 1989 revolutions as attempts to negate the destruction of 1917
(which brought about the total destruction of bourgeoisie) by the ‘restora-
tion’ of liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, Nolte also reads these events as
the final confirmation of his ‘grand theory’ of twentieth century history. 1989
marks the end of the ‘Weltbürgerkrieg’, that is the world civil war—the term
Nolte coined for the description of the cold war. World civil war was, accord-
ing to Nolte, the logical continuation of the European civil war 1917-1945,
which was characterised by the violent struggle of two competing ideologies
and political regimes, that of Nazism and Communism.12
The problem with this kind of militant anti-communism is that it displays
Jacobin tendencies that may be characteristic of many contemporary politi-
cal movements on the Right, but are far removed from the thinking of those
Central European dissidents who prevailed in 1989 (their anti-communism
was anything but militant!). In fact, it is worth remembering that the Nazis
were militant anti-communists, who also saw the French Revolution as antic-
ipating the Bolshevik revolutions. Theirs was a ‘conservative revolution’
openly directed against the universal liberal values of the French Revolution.
Militant anti-communism can be thus brought close to Goebbels who com-
mented after the Nazi takeover in 1933: “With a stroke we have now oblit-
erated 1789 from the history books.”13 Clearly, the reluctant revolutionaries
of 1989 were conservative in radically different ways, not least because they
actually endorsed the enlightened values (partly) inherited from the French
Revolution, while they remained committed to the rejection of violence in
political struggle.
Strange Revolutions/Strange Revolutionaries14
The revolutions of 1989 do not fit easily into any preconceived notion of rev-
olutionary change in Europe. These were self-limiting revolutions in which
there was very little, or no violence; no radical break with the past; and very
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little or no revenge towards those who were responsible for the injustices of
the old regime. In direct opposition to the revolutionary regime change orches-
trated by the communists after the Second World War, the revolutions of 1989
were marked by constraint, not radicalism. They were, as Gale Stokes astutely
observed, “revolutionary in the negative sense that they interred any realis-
tic hope that the teleological experiment in the use of human reason to trans-
form society in its entirety might succeed.”15 In this way, they undermined
the credibility of the revolutionary tradition usually traced back to the French
Revolution, which was driven by the belief that radically new ideas would
give rise to radically improved societies.
By any standards, the dissident intellectuals in Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, who were catapulted into the position of leaders of these revolu-
tions, were very unlikely revolutionaries. The likes of Václav Havel in
Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland and György Konrád in Hungary
saw their struggle against the omnipotent communist state as an ‘anti-polit-
ical’ struggle for authenticity, not a fight for political power. In line with this,
they were reluctant to ally themselves with clearly defined ideological posi-
tions. Instead they appealed to a set of basic human values, assuming that a
regime built on hypocrisy, greed and conformism could be defeated by truth-
fulness and a sense of basic human decency (hence Havel’s notion of the “liv-
ing in truth”).16
1989 and Theories of Modernisation
These ideas may have been noble, but to many western observers they seemed
antiquated and unsuitable as a basis for a coherent and clearly formulated
political program. In line with this, dissident intellectuals and their ideas
were not at the centre of scholarly attention before and (not even) after the
collapse of communism.17 The disregard of western scholars towards intel-
lectual developments amongst dissident intellectuals in Central and Eastern
Europe was even easier to justify after the collapse of communism. There
was not much to study, so the argument went, given the fact that the 1989
revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe did not bring about any new ideas.
Jürgen Habermas, for example, identified as early as in 1990 “a peculiar 
characteristic of this revolution, namely its total lack of ideas that are either
innovative or oriented towards the future.”18 According to Claus Offe, this
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was also the reason why the prospects for the success of the postcommunist
transition were rather slim. In a situation in which “the negative coalitions
of dissidents and citizens’ movements had no coherent political and economic
project on their own,”19 there was little hope for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe to master the multiple challenges of economic and political
transformation. It was Offe who coined the memorable phrase of the “tun-
nel at the end of the light,” which best captured the pessimistic predictions
of many political theorists at the time.20
We know now that most of those gloomy predictions did not materialise. The
countries of Central Europe did not relapse to old, or new forms of despo-
tism. It is worth remembering, however, that immediately after 1989 it would
have been prudent to expect that the revolutions would turn nasty, and that
people would end up supporting some kind of authoritarian regimes. The
challenges ahead were indeed formidable, and it was by no means inevitable,
for example, that the eruption of violence fuelled by extreme nationalism was
limited to the Balkans. Yet, no similar developments took place in the coun-
tries of Central Europe. This is not to suggest that this process is irreversible,
or that there are no challenges ahead—far from it. But I think that it is fair
to say that despite many difficulties and significant current challenges, all the
countries of Central Europe have developed remarkably stable political regimes,
in which “liberal democracy is the only game in town.”21
Historically speaking the failure of the revolutions would not have been
unusual—it is their success that is remarkable and calls for explanation. As
Hannah Arendt noted “it is perfectly true and a sad fact indeed, that most
so-called revolutions, far from achieving constitutio libertatis, have not even
been able to produce constitutional guarantees of civil rights and liberties,
the blessings of ‘limited government.’”22 Contrary to Offe’s assumptions, I
will argue (relying on Arendt and Burke) that the key to understanding the
success of the 1989 Revolutions in Central Europe was their lack of radically
new ideas. It was precisely because these revolutions were unoriginal and back-
ward-looking that they were also largely successful.23
But before discussing 1989 as self-limiting conservative revolutions, it is use-
ful to recall some crucial arguments of the theories of modernisation. Possibly
the most plausible explanation for the revolutions of 1989 was to see them
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as ‘catching up revolutions’, revolutions which simply allowed the societies
behind the former iron curtain to catch up with the rest of Europe in its never-
ending march towards modernity.
This interpretation had the great advantage of assimilating the experience of
1989 into the existing narratives of European history based on theories of
modernisation. Although most observers rejected Fukuyama’s claim about
the end of history as far too simplistic, they were less disinclined to see 1989
as the culmination of those historic processes that were triggered originally
in 1789. While the French Revolution marks the birth of modernity, 1989
brings Europe to maturity. In this account, the path of European civilisation
towards ever-greater progress was merely interrupted by the tragic accidents
of Nazism and communism. Typical is the assessment by Francois Furet, who
believed that the revolutions of 1989 imbued
the famous principles of 1789 with a certain freshness and with renewed
universality. As we begin to close the long and tragic digression that was
the Communist illusion, we find ourselves more than ever confronted by
the great dilemmas of democracy as they appeared at the end of the 18th
century, expressed by ideas and by the course of the French Revolution.24
Furet’s view is not without justification and it resonates with the views of
some of the actors of the revolutions in 1989. György Konrád, for example,
noted that their timing was “an edifying coincidence, one might say: an
homage, at a remove of two hundred years, to the revolution that first pro-
claimed the civil rights of the individual.”25 In fact, the most popular slogan
of these revolutions, “the return to Europe,” could be seen as the invocation
of those principles that are usually associated with the heritage of the French
Revolution: the ideals of freedom, equality and solidarity.26
Yet, the reliance on the theories of modernisation and the French Revolution
as the exclusive paradigm of radical political change obscures some unique
features of the revolutions of 1989. These theories focus on abstract historic
forces and are hence ill equipped to deal with the impact of those impon-
derable factors that make societal change such a fascinating (and unpre-
dictable) subject of inquiry: the role of personalities and their ideas; the role
of cultural and political identities and the like. More generally, the theories
of modernisation have little to add to our understanding of possibilities to
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challenge repressive political structures from within. It is telling that while
most of those observers who were indebted to the modernisation theories
failed to predict the collapse of communism, in hindsight the theory gives
the most plausible explanation for the reasons of the ‘inevitability’ of this
collapse.27
Moreover, 1989 invalidated (or at least thoroughly discredited) one of the
defining principles of 1789; the principle extolled by revolutionary leaders
and thinkers from Robespierre through Lenin to æiΩek, that a radical societal
change is only possible as a result of a violent struggle.28 The reluctant rev-
olutionaries in Central Europe refused to accept that revolutionary violence
should be used (and justified) as a liberating force. They rejected “the Jacobin
orientations and program” based on “the belief in the possibility of trans-
forming society through totalistic political action.” In this way, the 1989 rev-
olutions in Central Europe could be seen as undermining the credibility of
that component of contemporary political discourse which S.N. Eisenstadt
calls the “Jacobin dimension of modernity.”29
One of the obvious possible conclusions to draw from the limitations of mod-
ernisation theories in relation to the collapse of communism is to construe
the 1989 revolutions as ‘post-modern’. “Modernity’s failure,” in this view,
ushered into “post-modernity’s predicament.”30 “Postcommunism is post-
modern,” avers Richard Sakwa, “in the paradoxical sense that it returns to
premodern traditions truncated by the triumph of modernity from the late
eighteenth century.”31
The anti-communist revolutions of 1989-91 transcended the logic of mod-
ern vanguardist revolutions by espousing specific rather than universal
goals, by transcending sectarian agendas with national ones, and by reject-
ing rather than innovating. . . . [T]hese were ‘anti-revolutions,’ repudiating
the dynamic of revolution and counter-revolution in their entirety. In short,
post-communism is post-revolutionism.32
In a similar vein, Boris Kapustin critiques the reductionism of modernisation
theories for their tendency to assume that there is “an uncompromising oppo-
sition between ‘tradition,’ or better, ‘traditionalism,’ and ‘modernity.’”33
However, the attempts to replace modernisation theories with suitably adjusted
theories of postmodernity are themselves not without limitations. Ironically,
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these theories still rely (if only implicitly) on the crude temporal logic that
divides history into pre-modern, modern and post-modern times. As Johann
P. Arnason reminds us, “visions of an existing or emerging postmodernity
are always based on oversimplified images of modernity.”34 Hence the terms
borrowed from post-modern discourse tend to obscure rather than clarify the
political developments in the countries of the former Eastern bloc.35 At any
rate, the talk about ‘post-communism-as-postmodernity’, or ‘post-commu-
nism as post-revolutionism’, adds little to our understanding of its problems
(let alone helping the actors to deal with them).
1989 as Self-limiting Conservative Revolutions
Rejecting various ‘postist’ labels and their pretensions,36 I want to suggest a
simpler conceptual framework that should allow us to evaluate the meaning
and significance of the 1989 revolutions without falling into the pitfalls of
modernisation theories. Ironically, the term that would possibly better describe
the events of 1989 is revolution in its original meaning as a return to an ear-
lier state of affairs. This is the kind of revolutionary change defended by the
critics of the French Revolution, such as Edmund Burke. Burke’s famous
rebuttal of the ideologically inspired violent excesses of the French Revolution
strongly resonates with the key insights of dissident intellectuals in Central
Europe: the concept of a self-limiting revolution, the idea of a ‘return to nor-
mality’ and the ideals of an ethical civil society and ‘anti-politics’.
One does not need to adopt a postmodern idiom to argue (as Kapustin did)
that it is unhelpful to postulate an unbridgeable gap between the political
program of modernity and tradition. As David Gress demonstrated in a recent
historic survey, the emergence of modernity and the concomitant rise of the
West should not be seen as marking a radical break in human history (which
can be conveniently dated with the French Revolution), but rather a result
of long-lasting historic developments that should be traced back to its Greek,
Latin and Christian origins. Gress challenges the myth of a sudden appear-
ance of freedom in the western world and guards against the influence of
the philosophical program of radical enlightenment (Rousseau). According
to Gress, the political, social and economic phenomenon of modern liberty
was made possible by the synthesis of the heritage of the Old West with the
political values that came to be equated with the New West.37 This is clearly
The Paradoxes of the Revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe • 369
CH_f13-361-390  11/22/04  11:09 PM  Page 369
in line with the kind of thinking represented by Edmund Burke (and later
Alexis de Tocqueville), but also of the dissident intellectuals in Central Europe.
Ever since Burke’s publication of the Reflections on the Revolution in France,38
the proponents of such revolutionary changes that aimed at delivering
(instantly) both liberty and equality had to deal with one of the fundamen-
tal dilemmas of liberal democracy: the fact that democracy can destroy lib-
erty. Thinkers as different as Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Lord
Acton, Hannah Arendt, and more recently Fareed Zakaria,39 from their dif-
ferent vantage points, warned against the danger of substituting the rule of
mob for the rule of law: this was the problem of ‘the tyranny of the majority’.
As Burke argued in his response to the French Revolution, unregulated lib-
erty can lead to anarchy, in which everyone would lose out:
When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong principle at work;
and this, for a while, is all I can possibly know of it. [. . .] I should there-
fore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France, until I 
was informed how it had been combined with government; with public
force; with the discipline and the obedience of armies; with the collection
of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion;
with the solidity of property; with peace and order: with civil and social
manners. [. . .]
The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please:
We ought to see what it will please them to do before we risque congratu-
lations, which may be soon turned into complaints.40
Burke’s reluctance to congratulate the French people on the attainment of lib-
erty was vindicated once the revolution descended into a more violent phase.
The guillotine and the reign of terror under Robespierre, in Burke’s view,
were not just an aberration marking the betrayal of the initial ideals of the
revolution, but a direct consequence of attempts at the implementation of
those very same radical ideas. This is not to say that the descent to anarchy
and the concomitant increase in political violence were inevitable, but rather
that certain radical ideals can pave ground for these developments. This les-
son was well understood by the dissident leaders in Central Europe who
370 • Stefan Auer
CH_f13-361-390  11/22/04  11:09 PM  Page 370
were vehemently opposed to the use of violence. Consider Michnik’s com-
ments about the virtues of democracy:
Democracy is not identical to freedom. Democracy is freedom written into
the rule of law. Freedom in itself, without the limits imposed on it by law
and tradition, is a road to anarchy and chaos—where the right of the strongest
rules.41
Michnik’s view echoes Burke, and is representative of the conscious effort of
the reluctant revolutionaries to lay the ground for liberty under the rule 
of law.
An Alternative Paradigm of Revolutionary Change: 1688 and
1776 not 1789
In fact, even Burke himself can be seen as a defender of the ideals of liberty
(if not equality), and a certain kind of revolutionary change, which he saw
best embodied in the Glorious Revolution in Britain of 1688. As the full title
of Burke’s seminal work indicates, there was another dimension to his critic
of the French Revolution often neglected in the discussions about modern
revolutions, which was his concern with the protection of the legacies of rev-
olution in Britain.42 Hence, Burke’s key insights can also help in understanding
the unique nature of 1989 by providing alternative points of reference, such
as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of 1776.
Burke’s account of the revolution of 1688 that focuses on the attempt to pre-
serve “antient indisputable laws and liberties,”43 can be related to the notion
of a “return to normality” in the countries of Central Europe. When Czechs,
Poles, Slovaks and Hungarians shed their oppressive regimes, they believed
(rightly or wrongly) that they were simply reclaiming their ancient liberties.
Hence, it was crucially important for the success of the 1989 revolutions in
Central Europe that the universal liberal ideals were ‘translated’ into domes-
tic nationalist discourses at the theoretical level,44 and into national constitu-
tions and the emerging legal orders at the practical level. In this context, it
is telling that the first president of the Hungarian constitutional court, László
Sólyom, was able to justify a number of controversial decisions by referring
to the existing “invisible constitution,” as well as “the history of constitutional
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democracies,” or “a common constitutional law of Europe.”45 Václav Havel
was also well aware of the challenge of embedding liberal principles within
the national context. As he argued in an interview with Adam Michnik for
the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, universal liberal principles could not
be a sufficient reason for the foundation of an independent state.
[Why] could we not become the seventeenth state of the Federal Republic
of Germany, why have an independent state because of something which
is a universal programme? I think it is necessary to seek other dimensions
of Czech political traditions and Czech statehood. Something, to my mind,
that has occurred repeatedly in Czech political life from time immemorial
is a sense of a broader responsibility. [. . .] This sense of responsibility and
the feeling that the Czech concern is a human concern (véc çeská je véc lidská)
can be found in St Wenceslas, Charles IV, George of Podébrady, Comenius,
Masaryk, Patoçka. I think that this political line should become a part of
the foundations of the new Czech state and even a warrant of its prospects.46
This combination of universalist and particularist agendas makes 1989 look
more like the American struggle for independence—at least when one accepts
Burke’s interpretation of these events. In his view, the American colonists did
not fight in the name of some abstract principles such as the Rights of Men,
but merely sought to “reclaim” their “Rights of Englishmen.” “The feelings
of the Colonies were formerly the feelings of Great Britain,” argued Burke.47
Freedom was the most precious inheritance that the Americans gained from
Britain:
We cannot, I fear, falsify the pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade
them that they are not sprung from a nation, in whose veins the blood of
freedom circulates. The language in which they would hear you tell them
this tale, would detect the imposition; your speech would betray you. An
Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman
into slavery.48
To do justice to Burke, it is important to acknowledge other differences between
the French and the American Revolutions, which make the latter look more
like the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe. Whatever is suggested in Thomas
Jefferson’s ambitious rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence, the goals of
the American Revolution were always more moderate than the goals of the
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French Revolution. They were tempered by the concern of its leaders to avoid
a descent into anarchy; to ensure stability and order in the new republic. As
Irving Kristol observed (relying largely on Arendt’s interpretation), “all rev-
olutions unleash tides of passion, and the American Revolution was no excep-
tion. But it was exceptional in the degree to which it was able to subordinate
these passions to serious and nuanced thinking about fundamental problems
of political philosophy.”49 This is the reason why Burke was able to endorse
the American Revolution and oppose the French one later without being
inconsistent.50
For similar reasons, both a Burkean and an Arendtian position towards the
American Revolution would allow for the endorsement of the revolutions in
1989. Michnik lends support to this interpretation in the Polish context,
“Solidarity has never had a vision of an ideal society. It wants to live and let
live. Its ideals are closer to the American Revolution than to the French.”51
Yet, not many observers have paid attention to the similarities between the
American Revolution of 1776 and the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe.52
This may simply be one of the consequences of the long lasting infatuation
of Western intellectuals with the French Revolution at the expense of its
American predecessor. As Arendt noted,
It was the French and not the American Revolution that set the world on
fire, and it was consequently from the course of the French Revolution, and
not from the course of events in America or from the acts of the Founding
Fathers, that our present use of the word ‘revolution’ received its connota-
tions and overtones everywhere . . . The sad truth of the matter is that the
French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while
the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event
of little more than local importance.53
However, if we accept the ‘Burkean’ view of the 1989 revolutions as mark-
ing the end of the modern revolutionary tradition in Europe (derived from
1789), then the order of importance of the two revolutions, which Arendt
bemoans, could be turned around. This is not to deny the limitations of the
American paradigm of revolutionary change. Arendt was well aware of the
difficulties in sustaining the noble values of the revolution, such as “public
freedom, public happiness, public spirit,”54 within everyday political practice
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once the revolution had been completed. The greatest challenge was how to
keep alive the revolutionary spirit without suffering the consequences of 
revolutionary instability. Yet, according to Arendt, the American Revolution
was more successful than its French counterpart in opening up new oppor-
tunities for citizens to become actively involved in politics as equals under
the rule of law, because it managed to keep the balance between two conflict-
ing elements: “the concern with stability and the spirit of the new.”55 By focus-
ing on political liberty rather than the issues of social equality, the American
Revolution created public space for authentic political engagement. As Winfried
Thaa forcefully demonstrated, the revolutions of 1989 can be seen as late vin-
dications of Arendt’s attempt to challenge the dominant concept of revolu-
tion in Europe with a “concept of revolution that does not seek the radical
overthrow of the societal order, but rather, orientated on the American model,
aims primarily at a renewal of the political space.”56
Another aspect of the French Revolution, which was not echoed in 1989, was
its adverse relation to religion. In fact, the hostility of the French enlighten-
ment to religion, which Burke abhorred, can be contrasted with the impor-
tance of religious sentiments that fed into the revolutions of 1989. This also
brings it closer to the American model that was “based on a political ideol-
ogy transformed from a religious experience but maintaining its religious 
orientations.”57
Spiritual Grounding of Liberal Democracy
The most obvious example to illustrate this is, of course, Poland, where the
role of the Catholic Church was not just contingent on the fact that it was
the only institution that was relatively independent of the state (though this
was undoubtedly an important factor too). There were also some profound
philosophical reasons why the fight for liberty was seen in alliance with the
fight for authentic religious faith. As the prominent Polish historian of Solidarity,
Jan Józef Lipski clearly demonstrated, the movement was strongly influenced
by a Christian ethos, which even a large majority of the non-religious mem-
bers adopted as their own. This attitude was described by Jacek Kuroñ in an
essay with a revealing title: “A Christian Without God.”58
In Slovakia too, the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in 1989 was anticipated by large reli-
gious demonstrations in the summer of 1988, which had both openly politi-
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cal as well as spiritual dimensions. Even in the Czech Republic, which is
characterised by a thoroughly secular society, the defence of human rights
was voiced in almost religious language. Consider Patoçka’s statement about
the importance of human rights, which was published in a key document of
Charter 77:
No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can
function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not depend
on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. . . . The idea of human
rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as
a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recog-
nise something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that
is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable . . .59
So, even Patoçka, while remaining truthful to phenomenology and its anti-
foundationalist philosophical position, sought to ground the idea of human
rights in “something unconditional.” Following in his steps, Havel repeat-
edly stressed the importance of morality in politics; he talked about higher
responsibility that he sought to justify with a reference to some higher entity:
whether it be God, “the chain of being,” “the voice of being,”60 or any other
metaphysical concept.61 While these philosophical positions may not warrant
Derrida’s reading of Patoçka as “a fundamentally Christian thinker,”62 let
alone æiΩek’s attack on Havel for his alleged “religious fundamentalism,”63
it is clear that both Patoçka and Havel were not dogmatically opposed to
Christianity and recognised it as an in important (though not the only) resource
for moral deliberations. Havel also repeatedly raised concerns about the
destructive potential of the more ambitious and radical aspects of enlight-
enment, which gave rise to ideological frameworks, or in Burke’s terminol-
ogy “abstract designs.”64
At any rate, both revolutions, the one in 1776 as well as the one in 1989, can
be described as self-limiting revolutions. The idea of a self-limiting revolu-
tion emerged partly as a pragmatic response to a new geopolitical situation
in Central and Eastern Europe. After a series of unsuccessful revolts against
the Soviet style authoritarian communist regimes (in 1953 in Germany, 1956
in Hungary and Poland, and 1968 in Czechoslovakia), it became clear that
no significant changes of the political system within the countries of Central
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Europe were possible as long as the Soviet Union was determined to main-
tain its control over its satellite states. Yet, the actions of the reluctant revo-
lutionaries in Central Europe were guided not only by these pragmatic
considerations. Equally, or even more important, was their conviction that
they had to exercise constraint in their own political struggle in order to pre-
vent “the very negative experiences of all unlimited social revolutions of the
Jacobin-Bolshevik type.”65 They were also convinced that the ‘post-totalitar-
ian’ communist regimes could have been challenged from within by peace-
ful means, if only enough people were determined to defy it. This was the
reasoning behind Havel’s seminal essay “The Power of the Powerless,” in
which he rejected the use of violence inspired by dogmatic ideologies:
‘dissidents’ tend to be sceptical about political thought based on the faith
that profound social changes can only be achieved by bringing about (regard-
less of the method) changes in the system or in the government, and the
belief that such changes—because they are considered ‘fundamental’—jus-
tify the sacrifice of ‘less fundamental’ things, in other words human lives.
Respect for a theoretical concept here outweighs respect for human life. Yet
this is precisely what threatens to enslave humanity all over again.66
Michnik was even more direct in rejecting the ideal of revolutionary violence
associated with the French Revolution: “to believe in overthrowing the dic-
tatorship of the party by revolution is both unrealistic and dangerous,” he
argued, because “those who use force to storm present-day Bastilles are likely
to build bigger and worse Bastilles.”67
Consequently, the opposition leaders were willing to constrain themselves in
their exercise of power even after the actual collapse of communism. They
made considerable efforts to maintain “the fiction of legal continuity with a
past without legality.”68 As Arato commented, this is one of the remarkable
legacies of 1989. “It is the great contribution of the Central and East European
struggle for legality in the midst of radical transformation that, even with-
out inherited republican institutions, the new can be built without total rup-
ture with the past.”69 The anti-communist revolutionaries were prepared to
make deals with their former communist foes, because they feared that the
alternative would have brought about a descent to chaos and anarchy. These
actors “were trying at all times to promote a revolution without a revolution.”70
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Another distinguishing feature of the self-limiting 1989 revolutions in Central
Europe was their negotiated character. The negotiations allowed for a polit-
ical transition that was radical in its speed but very moderate in its means.
One of the crucial factors in this was the restraint shown by the leaders of
the democratic opposition. Adam Michnik defended his conciliatory stance
towards the communists in the round table discussions in summer 1989 as
follows: “The path of negotiations brings many disappointments, bitterness,
and a sense of injustice and unfulfillment. But it does not bring victims.
Disappointed are those who are, after all, alive.”71
Moreover, the opposition leaders did not see themselves as the only possi-
ble representatives of “a monolithic people in revolt against its masters” but,
rather, sought to represent “the multiplicity and diversity of all citizens.”72
This point could be nicely illustrated with the analysis of the strategies used
by the Czechoslovak dissident movement Charter 77. As its founding mem-
bers such as Václav Havel and Jan Patoçka repeatedly stressed, the main pur-
pose of the movement was to engage the communist rulers in an open-ended
dialogue with all sectors of society. This ideal informed also the working
methods of the leading citizen movement in the revolution of 1989, the so-
called Civic Forum. The Czech historian Ji®í Suk may have gone too far by
suggesting that one could usefully relate this instigation to dialogue to the
Habermasian concept of a “communicative ethics,”73 but there can be little
doubt that they constituted an attempt to reclaim the public sphere as a space
for genuine political engagement. In this sense, one can also talk about “a
return to normality,”74 in which the lives of citizens were no longer to be
determined by the bureaucratic monopoly of the communist party, but rather
by an open-ended contest between different societal actors.
‘Return to Normality’
The notion of a ‘return to normality’ may have been very ambiguous,75 but
it found resonance with a vast majority of the people. Many Poles, Czechs,
Slovaks and Hungarians simply desired to restore a sense of normality after
the ‘foolish experiment’ of communism. The fact that this ‘normality’ was
equated with securing life-styles that were thought characteristic of the well-
established democracies in the West, and was hence quite removed from any
present or past experiences of the peoples in Central Europe, did not prevent
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them from seeing it as their natural destiny. It was their return to a past that
(may have) never existed (or a past they could have had but for communism).
As the Polish sociologist Jerzy Jedlicki wryly remarked, Poland has always
been returning to Europe, although it has actually never been there.76 Yet, it
is precisely thanks to this perception, that it was possible for the Poles, Czechs,
Slovaks and Hungarians to see their fight for liberty as being in line with the
best aspects of their own national traditions.77 In this way, the notion of a
return to normality linked the project of postcommunist transition, which was
oriented towards a liberal-democratic future, with the pre-communist past.
However, not only the pre-communist past served as a point of reference for
the evaluation of liberal values. The new leaders also sought to rally people
in support of liberal values by recalling their failed revolts against commu-
nism. This return to the best aspects of dissident past(s) was obviously in
conflict with the second aspect of self-limiting conservative revolutions, the
effort to maintain the fiction of legal continuity with the illegal and illegiti-
mate communist regime. Clearly, these were contradictory impulses: one
could not ‘preserve’ pasts, which were so radically different and even mutu-
ally exclusive. Yet, it was done even when it led to grotesque occurrences. It
suffices to recall that Václav Havel, who as a leader of Charter 77 was thor-
oughly despised by the communists, was voted into the presidency of
Czechoslovakia in December 1989 by the national assembly clearly domi-
nated by the communists. 
In fact, there is a further irony that makes the 1989 revolutions conservative
in the Burkean sense. Even though the 1989 revolutions shared a number of
goals with 1789, which Burke opposed in his own times, many of the radi-
cal ideas from more than 200 hundred years ago seem less radical today. For
example, Burke was not unusual in his own time in opposing democratic
ideals and the modern concept of citizenship;78 these enlightened concepts
were generally seen as too radical, and dangerous for liberty. However, two
hundred years after the French Revolution the ideals of the French revolu-
tionaries themselves became a part of a European, or Western tradition,79 and
most people today would not think of democracy and liberty as inherently
incompatible.
Similarly, the ideal of universal human rights, which was vehemently opposed
by Burke as far too radical and dangerous, has become a powerful source of
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inspiration for people with vastly different backgrounds; the discourse of
human rights today cuts across all ideological boundaries. It is worth remem-
bering, however, that this is a result of a relatively recent development (from
Helsinki 1975 to Charter 1977 to the notion of ‘human rights wars’ in Kosovo
and Iraq), in which Central and East European intellectuals played a crucial
role. Even Arendt subscribed to Burke’s views on human rights as late as in
the 1960s. As she put it, “the perplexities of the Rights of Man are manifold,
and Burke’s famous argument against them is neither obsolete nor ‘reac-
tionary.’”80 Like Burke, Arendt believed that the ideal of universal human
rights is far too ambitious to be useful in practical politics.81 Like Burke, she
was convinced that people only acquire rights through belonging to a par-
ticular political community, one which is capable and willing of enforcing
them: “We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on
the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”82
Anti-Politics and Civil Society
Due to the recent popularity of the concept of civil society, which transcends
ideological boundaries, it may be easily forgotten that the concept was orig-
inally based on a rather conservative ideal—the conviction that free societies
rely on private virtues. Good character and virtue, according to Burke, can-
not be developed as a result of an abstract ideal of humanity. They can only
be fostered within a relatively small community of citizens here and now;
within the ‘little platoons’, in which everyone knows their place (moving in
expanding concentric circles from your family to your neighbourhood, from
your neighbourhood to your city, from your city to your nation and the wider
world). One does not become virtuous simply by understanding and accept-
ing the wisdom of Rousseau’s ‘General Will’, or the Kantian ‘categorical impe-
rative’. Similarly, for Hannah Arendt, there is not much use in invoking the
noble principles of liberty, unless the kind of political space is (re-)created in
society, in which authentic actions of independent citizens can take place. Burke’s
own personal example showed that this is not to say that one should limit
one’s moral concerns to one’s own small community. But the starting point
must be your concern with the individuals here and now. As Burke put it:
I have no great opinion of that sublime abstract, metaphysic reversionary,
contingent humanity, which in cold blood can subject the present time and
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those whom we daily see and converse with to immediate calamities in favour
of the future and uncertain benefit of persons who only exist in idea.83
Once again, this kind of reasoning resonates with the convictions of dissi-
dent intellectuals (for example, Havel, Michnik, Konrád), who strongly believed
that only through changing the ‘hearts and minds’ of individual members of
society could communism be defeated, and later the process of postcommu-
nist transition succeed. This is why Havel repeatedly stressed that one must
turn away from “abstract political visions of the future and toward concrete
human beings and ways of defending them effectively in the here and now.”84
Hence, any genuine political engagement had to be a result of taking con-
crete responsibility. This was the ideal of an ethical civil society.
In its initial form, the concept of civil society was not meant to be revolu-
tionary; civil society was not seen as directed against the state, but was sup-
posed to complement it. That was the vision inherited “from Locke, the
Scottish Enlightenment, Burke, Hegel, and de Tocqueville.”85 As one of the
leading Hungarian intellectuals, G.M. Tamás, explained, the dissidents in
Central Europe appropriated this concept creatively for their own purposes
and turned it against the oppressive communist state. This antagonism between
state and society is reminiscent more of Thomas Paine than Burke, and it is
not surprising, hence, that the Central European concept of civil society had
strong appeal to the left-wing intellectuals in the West.86 It was Paine who
asserted in Common Sense that “society is in every state a blessing, but gov-
ernment, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil.”87
The dissident’s suspicion of the communist state and its official ideology,
Marxism, found its expression in the idea of anti-politics. Anti-politics was
directed not only against the state, but any institutionalised politics, and was
hostile not only towards Marxism, but any (dogmatic) political ideology in
general. However, it would be a crude misunderstanding to see the ideal of
anti-politics as apolitical. On the contrary, by liberating individuals from the
constraints of institutional politics and the schematic thinking imposed by
abstract ideological frameworks, individuals were empowered to endow their
actions with authentic meaning: in this sense personal became political. The
ideal of anti-politics urged people to act “as if” they were free,88 and to assume
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responsibility that comes with freedom. Hence, anti-politics was not a poli-
tics without principles, rather simply a “politics without cliché.”89
In fact, if there is one distinct contribution from the intellectuals from Central
and Eastern Europe to political theory in general, it is to be found in their
conviction that “the old categories of ideological contestation have become
hopelessly clichéd: they refer only to themselves in tendentious circles of self-
referentiality.”90 While many intellectuals in the West seem still indebted to
these ideological frameworks (even when intent on overcoming them),91 most
intellectuals in Central Europe abandoned them. However, even though this
‘post-ideological’ position rejects all great narratives it would be a mistake
to label it as post-modern (especially if postmodernism implies moral rela-
tivism). As I have argued, it is much closer to the thinking of the likes of
Burke, who identified the dangers of schematic ideological thinking well
before it became one of the dominant features of modernity. Arendt shared
this suspicion of ideologies, which have the tendency to neatly divide the
political world into binary oppositions. This is reflected in her critique of con-
ventional theories of revolution, which underpin the argument about the self-
limiting conservative revolutions of 1989 advanced in this article. In her view,
“the very fact that these two elements [which were contained in the spirit of
revolution], the concern with stability and the spirit of the new, have become
opposites in political thought and terminology—the one being identified as
conservatism and the other being claimed as the monopoly of progressive
liberalism—must be recognized to be among the symptoms of our loss.”92
Hence, following Arendt, the legacy of the revolutions of 1989 in Central
Europe can be seen as an invitation to rethink the relationship between the
ongoing concern with political stability and the desire for a radical renewal.
Concluding Remarks
The attempts of Central European dissidents to reclaim the sphere of politics
as a place for human authenticity resulted in their rejection of ideologies.
Leszek Kopiakowski offered a witty justification of this approach in the late
1970s. He proposed the establishment of a Conservative-Liberal Socialist
International, which was based on the assumption that the differences between
the sensible parts of these ideologies were not insurmountable. Thus, their
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conflicting demands were not mutually exclusive.93 In line with this, the dis-
sident intellectuals in Central Europe were able to follow radically conflict-
ing ideals that led to the relative success of their self-limiting conservative
revolutions in 1989.
The goals of these conservative revolutionaries were both modest and ambi-
tious. They were modest, because they did not openly seek political power,
ambitious because they aimed at a redefinition of political space and activi-
ties within it. It may be questioned as to how successful these revolutions
were in delivering those more ambitious goals. As Arendt reminds us, to sus-
tain the spirit of the revolution after the event is very difficult, if not impos-
sible. However, the attempts of the reluctant revolutionaries to reclaim the
sphere of politics as a place for human authenticity must be seen, like democ-
racy, as a part of an open-ended project—a normative ideal worth striving
for, rather than something that can be achieved overnight (or in those 15
years that passed since the collapse of communism). The revolutions were
successful to the extent that they created preconditions for liberty under the
rule of law. The relative success of the conservative revolutions in Central
Europe could give some hope to those political theorists who, like S.N.
Eisenstadt, believe that ‘the paradoxes of democracy’ do not need to (and
should not) lead to its ultimate demise.
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